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Abstract
We give a column generation based branch and bound algorithm
for coalition structure generation over graphs problem using valuation
functions for which this problem is proven to be NP-complete. For a
given graph G = (V,E) and a valuation function w : 2V → R, the
problem is to find the most valuable coalition structure (or partition)
of V . We consider two cases: first when the value of a coalition is
the sum of the weights of its edges which can be positive or negative,
second when the value of a coalition takes account of both inter- and
intra-coalitional disagreements and agreements, respectively. For both
valuations we give experimental results which cover for the first time
sets of more than forty agents.
For another valuation function (coordination) we give only the the-
oretical considerations in the appendix.
Keywords: coalition structure generation, linear programming,
quadratic programming, column generation, coalition valuation function.
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1 Introduction
Coalition structure generation (CSG) is a major problem in artificial intel-
ligence ([13]), multi-agent systems ([2], [14]) communication networks, co-
operative game theory ([3], [4], [12]), scheduling ([7]), economic theory (like
combinatorial auctions) etc. Given a set of agents V = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and a
valuation function v : 2V → R assigning a value to any coalition of agents,
the problem is to partition the set of agents into pairwise disjoint classes
(coalitions) such that the sum of their values is maximized. CSG is one
of the steps in the coalition formation process [11] which may include also
optimizing the coalitions performance and rewarding the coalitions value
among the members.
CSG comes from real-world applications: consider a set of agents who
can cooperate by working in coalitions. Some of them work better together
while others find difficult to cooperate. The problem is to maximize the so
called social well-fare or the total value of the designated coalitions. Classi-
cal cooperative game theory usually uses a super-additive valuation function
that values better a merged coalition than the sum of of the values of the
component coalitions. This leads to the great coalition formation which can
be costly to coordinate and/or manipulate. Besides these considerations
there are natural constraints on possible coalitions, hence the abstractions
like super-additivity are not always appropriate for modeling the coalitions
values and the agents should be divided into smaller coalitions.
The problem is computationally difficult: the input specification for all
2|V | possible coalitions is intractable even for reasonable values of |V | and the
computational difficulty maintains even under quite restrictive assumptions.
The literature presents a very large number of approaches to CSG problem
like (see [10]): dynamic programming, meta heuristic methods, branch and
bound algorithms based on dividing the searching space, anytime algorithms
that maintain a monotonically improving feasible solution etc.
Our setting is that of (mixed) integer linear/quadratic programming
and is based on the classical model of the set partitioning problem in a graph.
Given a graph G = (V,E) the vertices are agents and the edges represent
connections between agents. We study two types of valuation functions:
the edge sum and the correlation functions. The value of a coalition by
the edge sum valuation function ([3]) is the sum of the weights of its edges
(suppose we have a weight function defined on the set of edges); this function
frequently occurs in communication networks and cooperative game theory.
The correlation valuation function ([1]) is defined on the entire coalition
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structure, although it can be defined on coalitions only, and occurs in the
clustering framework. This function takes account of the agreements from
inside and the disagreements from outside the structure - an edge being
labeled with a plus or a minus depending on whether the involved agents
are similar or different.
Our approach is based on solving an integer linear programming prob-
lem, which is equivalent with CSG, using a branch and bound algorithm
in which the problems in nodes are built by means of column generation
method. This approach works as long as the involved sub-problem can
be solved. We proved that this can be done for edge sum and correlation
valuation functions since the sub-problem becomes a quadratic knapsack
problem with forbidden configurations. This variant of quadratic knapsack
problem can be solved in practice using the corresponding integer quadratic
programming model or the mixed integer linear programming equivalent
model.
Our numerical results show that we can approach by this method sets of
up to 45 agents depending on the magnitude of the weight function for edge
sum valuation function and up to 40 agents for the correlation valuation
function, using a regular home PC.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the LP model and
the column generation framework, section 3 is dedicated to the two valuation
functions outlining the corresponding sub-problems and their linearizations,
section 4 describes the branch and bound algorithm, and the last section
contains the numerical results and the conclusions. The appendix contains
..
2 LP model and column generation
Consider V = {1, 2, . . . , n} to be a set of n agents and v : 2V → R a valuation
function on the power set of V . A coalition structure is a collection of disjoint
exhaustive subsets C1, C2, . . . , Cp, where Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ p
and
p⋃
i=1
Ci = V .
The problem of finding a coalition structure of maximum value is equiv-
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alent with the set partitioning problem (SPP) (see [7]):
max
2n−1∑
j=0
v(Cj)xj (1)
2n−1∑
j=0
aijxj = 1,∀i ∈ V, (2)
xj ∈ {0, 1},∀j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2
n − 1} (3)
where {C0, C1, . . . , C2n−1} is an enumeration of 2
V and (aij)i∈V is the char-
acteristic vector of Cj, for each j, that is
aij =
{
1, if i ∈ Cj
0, otherwise
, for each j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1}. (4)
We can relax the integrality constraints by replacing (3) with
xj ≥ 0,∀j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2
n − 1} (3’)
Writing the original relaxed problem as a minimum one means to re-
place (1) by (1’) (by ignoring the minus in front of min)
min

2n−1∑
j=0
−v(Cj)xj

 (1’)
The dual of the problem (1’), (2) , (3’) is
max

 n∑
j=1
pii

 (5)
n∑
i=1
aijpii ≤ −v(Cj),∀j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2
n − 1} (6)
pii ∈ R,∀i ∈ V (7)
Let C0 = ∅, and Cj = {j}, for any j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. An initial feasible
basic solution to the problem (1’), (2), (3’) could be that corresponding to
the coalition structure ({1}, {2}, . . . {m}), that is, x1, x2, . . . , xm. Now we
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restrict the problem to a small number of variables including x1, x2, . . . , xm
and we get the restricted master problem (RMP):
min

∑
j∈J
−v(Cj)xj

 (8)
∑
j∈J
aijxj = 1,∀i ∈ V, (9)
xj ≥ 0,∀j ∈ J (10)
where J = {1, 2, . . . ,m} ∪ J ′ ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , 2m − 1}.
The dual of the RMP is
max
(
n∑
i=1
pii
)
(11)
n∑
i=1
aijpii ≤ −v(Cj),∀j ∈ J (12)
pii ∈ R,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n (13)
Let (x,pi) be an optimum primal-dual solution for this pair of prob-
lems; we look for a non-basic variable (column) with the minimum negative
reduced cost (Dantzig rule) - by solving a corresponding sub-problem - that
would be added to the current restricted master problem. When such a
variable doesn’t exist we can stop: we have an optimum solution to the
primal problem. The sub-problem is to find
j0 = argmax
j∈{0,1,...,2n−1}\J
(
v(Cj) +
n∑
i=1
aijpii
)
(14)
The arising question is: how can we solve problem (14)? The answer
depends on the form of the valuation function v(·). In the following sections
we will analyze this sub-problem for two of the most frequent used valuation
functions defined for coalition structure over graphs: the edge-sum and the
correlation valuation functions.
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3 Coalition Structure Generation over Graphs
3.1 The edge-sum valuation
Let G = (V,E) be graph and w : E → R a weight function on its edges.
The corresponding edge-sum coalition valuation function is
v : P(V )→ R, v(C) =
∑
ij∈E:i,j∈C
wij,∀C ⊆ V.
This function was extensively studied in the context of cooperative game
theory ([3]) and the corresponding CSG problem is NP-hard being as hard
as the MAX-CUT problem.
Now, if v is the characteristic vector of the generic coalition C, then
the sub-problem becomes:
max
v∈{0,1}m,v 6=χCj ,∀j∈J

∑
ij∈E
wijvivj +
∑
i∈V
piivi

 > 0 (15)
That is, the sub-problem is a quadratic knapsack problem with forbidden
configurations (QKPf). We can find a new column to add to the restricted
master problem if and only if this quadratic knapsack problem has a strictly
positive optimal objective value.
QKPf could be a computationally difficult problem since the quadratic
knapsack problem (QKP) is known to be NP-hard (being a generalization
of Clique problem). By rephrasing it we get:
max

∑
ij∈E
wijvivj +
∑
i∈V
piivi

 (16)
∑
i∈Cj
vi +
∑
i/∈Cj
(1− vi) ≥ 1,∀j ∈ J (17)
vi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ V (18)
This problem has a quadratic objective but only linear constraints:
an Integer Quadratic Programming (IQP) problem. Such a problem can be
solved by using a mathematical optimization solver as such or by linearizing
it first in order to transform it into a Mixed Integer Linear Programming
(MILP) problem. We note here that the known methods used for solving
such a problem are not applicable here since the usual requirements are
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to have natural or positive coefficients for the quadratic (some times non-
diagonal) terms ([5], [8]). Hence we had to settle to solve it as a general
IQP problem using a mathematical optimization solver.
3.2 The correlation valuation
Suppose we have a function e : E → {+,−} that assigns to each edge
ij ∈ E the labels + or − depending on whether agents i and j are similar
or different (this function arises in clustering frameworks). A valuation
function that takes account of both inter- and intra-coalitional similarities
can be defined in the following way ([1]): we want to minimize the number of
mistakes: a positive mistake occurs when e(ij) = −, with i and j belonging
to the same coalition, a negative one occurs when e(ij) = +, but i and j
belong to different coalitions. Or, equivalently, we maximize the number
of agreements; first define, for a coalition C ⊆ V , the intra- and inter-
coalitional connections
Intra+(C) = |{ij ∈ E : e(ij) = +, i, j ∈ C}|,
Inter−(C) = |{ij ∈ E : e(ij) = −, i ∈ C, j /∈ C}}|.
The correlation valuation function is
v : P(V )→ R, v(C) = Intra+(C) + Inter−(C)/2,∀C ⊆ V.
It was proven in ([1]) that the corresponding sub-problem is NP -complete.
We define two weight functions on the set of edges of G, w+, w− : E → {0, 1},
by
w+(ij) = w+ij =
{
1, if e(ij) = +
0, if e(ij) = −
,
w−(ij) = w−ij =
{
1, if e(ij) = −
0, if e(ij) = +
,∀ij ∈ E.
Let v be the characteristic vector of the generic coalition C, then
v(C) =
1
2
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
w+ijvivj +
1
2
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
w−ijvi(1− vj).
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The sub-problem (14) becomes the following QKPf problem:
max

1
2
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
w+ijvivj +
1
2
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
w−ijvi(1− vj) +
∑
i∈V
piivi

 (19)
∑
i∈Cj
vi +
∑
i/∈Cj
(1− vi) ≥ 1,∀j ∈ J (20)
vi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ V (21)
3.3 The linearization of QKPf
We present here the linearization due to Glover ([6]) for solving QKP. First,
we consider the following equivalent form of the objective function quadratic
fragment
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
w′ijvivj , where 2w
′
ij = wij, for each i 6= j, and w
′
ii = 0, for
all i ∈ V . Second,
n∑
j=1
w′ijvivj is replaced by a new real variable ui, and we
add four new constraints
W
′−
i vi ≤ ui ≤W
′+
i vi,
n∑
j=1
w′ijvj −W
′+
i (1− vi) ≤ ui ≤
n∑
j=1
w′ijvj −W
′−
i (1− vi),
where W
′−
i and W
′+
i are a lower and, respectively, an upper bound for
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
w′ijvj , e.g.:
W
′−
i =
∑
j:w′ij<0
w′ij and W
′+
i =
∑
j:w′ij>0
w′ij (22)
The problem (16) - (18) becomes, after replacing w′ij, W
′−
i , and W
′+
i ,
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by correspondingly wij, W
−
i , and W
+
i (and substituting 2ui by ui)
max
(∑
i∈V
piivi +
∑
i∈V
ui
)
∑
i∈Cj
vi +
∑
i/∈Cj
(1− vi) ≥ 1,∀j ∈ J,
∑
j:ij∈E
wijvj +W
+
i vi − ui ≤ W
+
i ,∀i ∈ V,
∑
j:ij∈E
wijvj +W
−
i vi − ui ≥ W
−
i ,∀i ∈ V,
W−i vi − ui ≤ 0,∀i ∈ V,
W+i vi − ui ≥ 0,∀i ∈ V,
vi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ V,
ui ∈ R,∀i ∈ V.
For the correlation valuation function the corresponding model can be
linearized as in a similar way; replacing the coefficients of the linear fragment
with pi =
1
2
∑
j∈V
w−ij + pii,∀i ∈ V , we get the following linear formulation of
the problem (19) - (21):
max
(∑
i∈V
pivi +
∑
i∈V
ui
)
∑
i∈Cj
vi +
∑
i/∈Cj
(1− vi) ≥ 1,∀j ∈ J,
∑
j:ij∈E
w′ijvj +W
′+
i vi − ui ≤ W
′+
i ,∀i ∈ V,
∑
j:ij∈E
w′ijvj +W
′−
i vi − ui ≥ W
′−
i ,∀i ∈ V,
W
′−
i vi − ui ≤ 0,∀i ∈ V,
W
′+
i vi − ui ≥ 0,∀i ∈ V,
vi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ V,
ui ∈ R,∀i ∈ V,
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where w′ij = 0.5·(w
+
ij−w
−
ij), for all i, j ∈ V , and the upper and lower bounds
(W
′+
i and W
′−
i ) may have the same expressions like in (22).
These last problems are Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)
problems that have a reasonable size and can theoretically be solved by the
means of a mathematical optimization solver. We presented these linear
models for the sake of completeness, but the numerical results for them are,
by now, - in terms of running time performance - not encouraging. The
optimization solver we used performs better on the quadratic models.
4 Branch and Bound algorithm
Suppose that the current node in the branching tree has a subset of already
covered agents, U =
⋃
j∈J :xj=1
Cj, and U
′ = V \U . For the edge-sum valuation
the sub-problem becomes:
max

∑
i∈U ′
∑
j∈U ′
wijvivj +
∑
i∈U ′
piivi

 (23)
∑
i∈Cj
vi +
∑
i/∈Cj
(1− vi) ≥ 1,∀j ∈ J, s. t. Cj ⊆ U
′.
(24)
vi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ U
′. (25)
For the correlation valuation function the sub-problem (14) becomes:
max

1
2
∑
i∈U ′
∑
j∈U ′
(w+ij − w
−
ij)vivj +
∑
i∈U ′

1
2
∑
j∈V
w−ij + pii

 vi

 (26)
∑
i∈Cj
vi +
∑
i/∈Cj
(1− vi) ≥ 1,∀j ∈ J, s. t. Cj ⊆ U
′.
(27)
vi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ U
′. (28)
Both these problems have linearization variants.
At each node of the branching tree we first build the current LP relax-
ation in two steps: (1) we reduce the variables number by taking account of
the branching variables along the path to the root, and (2) we add the nec-
essary variables to the parent node LP relaxation by the means of column
generation method.
A B&B Algorithm for Coalition Structure Generation over Graphs 11
Step (1) is implemented by effectively fixing to 0 the variables xh such
that Ch∩U 6= ∅ (or, equivalently, Ch∩Cj 6= ∅, for some branching variable
xj set to 1), and removing the branching variables xi set to 0. The fixing
procedure can be achieved by looking in each equation (2) that contains a
branching variable set to 1. In this way any branching variable set to 1,
that corresponds to a medium sized coalition, has the effect of drastically
reducing the size of the corresponding mathematical programming model.
While step (1) is basically the same for both valuation functions, step
(2) depends on the specific sub-problem. Step (2) consists in repeatedly
solving the corresponding sub-problem while the optimum objective func-
tion value is strictly positive. The implementation, however, requires this
value to be positive within some tolerance. If this step would not have been
subjected to numerical restriction, then the algorithm would have been an
exact method.
Our branching rule works in a classical way: we choose a variable,
xj, from the optimal solution in the current node of the branching tree
such that its value is around 0.5 (e. g. xj ∈ (0.35, 0.65) - if possible). It
is worth-noting that, for our specific problems, this enumerative method
(branch and bound) doesn’t need upper bounds because in almost all cases
a feasible solution occurs very early - mostly after performing one of the first
type (1) steps. The overall effect is that the branching tree has a medium
size: we limited the number of branching tree size to 40, but this bound was
hardly reached.
5 Numerical results
In this section we evaluate the performance of our algorithm. A major part
of the running time of our algorithm is concentrated in the root node of the
branching tree, where step (2) adds hundreds of new variables to the root
model, hence hundreds of sub-problems to solve (fortunately Gurobi solver
quickly finds optimal solutions to these QKPf problems), while for the other
nodes of the tree the number of such sub-problems drastically reduces.
The algorithm has been written in Java and run on an Intel(R) Core
(TM) i5-7500 CPU 3.40GHz computer with 8GB RAM, under Ubuntu
18.04.4 LTS. The linear and quadratic programming problems were solved
using Gurobi 9.0 under an Academic License.
Since there are no benchmarks in the literature for edge-sum or cor-
relation valuation functions, the algorithm has been tested on randomly
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generated problems. Our test problems were built using the Gilbert model,
that is, each edge has a fixed probability of being present in the graph, in-
dependently of any other edges (probability 1 gives a complete graph). The
weights on edges are independently generated using a Gaussian distribution
N(0, 0.2) (a certain similar valuation function occurs in [9]). The name of
the benchmark file indicates the probability that an edge belongs to the
graph (”p”), the number of agents (”n”), and the number of the instance
(”s”).
We slightly generalized the use of the correlation function by supposing
that some edges don’t have signs at all, that is, allowing an incomplete
underlying graph. The random graphs were generated using the same model
and an edge has a ”+” or a ”−” sign with a prescribed probability. The
name of a benchmark file for this valuation indicates the probability that an
edge belongs to the graph (”p”), the probability of the plus sign (”pSign”),
the number of agents (”n”), and finally the number of the instance (”s”).
Table 1 shows the results of our numerical tests; it contains the op-
timum value in the root (LP problem), the (most of the time) optimum
value of the ILP problem found by branch and bound algorithm, the overall
running time, the running time for finding and solving the LP problem in
the root, the running time per node, the number of nodes of the branching
tree, the total number of variables added during the execution, the number
of nodes fathomed by integrality, and the gap between the LP and the ILP
optimum values.
Our algorithm is one of the first to present competitive results for more
than 20 agents for quite general valuation functions, using only a regular
PC. For half of the tests the root LP problem has an integer solution and for
all of them the gap is less than one percent. The branching trees (with few
exceptions) are small and most of the running time is concentrated in the
root and in the nodes corresponding to variables set to zero or variables set
to one but associated with small sized coalitions. Conducting the branch-
ing rule to find medium or large sized coalitions variables seems to be of
secondary interest since the resulting trees are small in size.
We listed only the results using the quadratic models for solving the
sub-problem, however the linear models have a good potential which de-
serves future exploring work (Lagrangian relaxation, special treatment of
the high degeneracy etc). Future work should also be directed towards
getting rid of the main burden of our algorithm: find specific methods for
solving QKPf. Another direction of future research could be a cut genera-
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Table 1: Solutions and computational times for different instances.
Instance
Solution CPU time (seconds) Number of
Gap
LP ILP overall root
per
node
nodes variables
int.
sol.
E
d
g
e-
su
m
va
lu
a
ti
o
n
p0.8n40s0 17.877 17.866 775 547 258.3 3 316 1 0.06%
p0.8n40s1 21.495 21.353 1,833 1,027 122.2 15 849 1 0.66%
p0.8n40s2 20.108 20.108 720 720 720.0 1 253 1 0.00%
p0.8n40s3 19.327 19.290 812 650 162.4 5 320 1 0.19%
p0.8n40s4 18.166 18.099 897 584 179.4 5 318 1 0.36%
p0.8n45s0 22.606 22.411 6,672 3,565 166.8 40 1,598 5 0.86%
p0.8n45s1 22.580 22.480 4,451 2,902 404.63 11 622 2 0.44%
p0.8n45s2 21.485 21.432 2,943 1,805 196.2 15 799 2 0.24%
p0.8n45s3 23.884 23.884 2,815 2,815 2,815.0 1 312 1 0.00%
p0.8n45s4 21.500 21.500 4,472 4,472 4,472.0 1 284 1 0.00%
p1.0n35s0 17.154 17.154 346 346 346.0 1 203 1 0.00%
p1.0n35s1 16.427 16.383 446 344 89.2 5 273 1 0.26%
p1.0n35s2 19.406 19.241 1,651 590 47.1 35 1,231 2 0.85%
p1.0n35s3 15.500 15.388 630 398 90.0 7 334 2 0.72%
p1.0n35s4 19.064 18.987 979 414 108.7 9 515 1 0.40%
p1.0n40s0 25.286 25.286 3,860 3,860 3,860.0 1 297 1 0.00%
p1.0n40s1 23.994 23.789 3,019 2,313 335.4 9 534 3 0.85%
p1.0n40s2 22.401 22.401 2,376 2,376 2,376.0 1 262 1 0.00%
p1.0n40s3 21.942 21.942 3,300 3,300 3,300.0 1 274 1 0.00%
p1.0n40s4 18.342 18.228 3,545 1,655 154.1 23 854 4 0.62%
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
va
lu
a
ti
o
n
p0.6pS0.6n35s0224.0 224 256 256 256.0 1 433 1 0.00%
p0.6pS0.6n35s1243.0 243 458 350 50.8 9 688 2 0.00%
p0.6pS0.6n35s2239.0 239 451 451 451.0 1 671 1 0.00%
p0.6pS0.6n35s3241.8 241 711 222 28.4 25 1,684 1 0.33%
p0.6pS0.6n35s4248.5 248 465 392 155 3 705 1 0.20%
p0.6pS0.6n40s0292.0 292 811 811 811.0 1 538 1 0.00%
p0.6pS0.6n40s1298.0 298 1,778 1,778 1,778.0 1 1,130 1 0.00%
p0.6pS0.6n40s2289.0 289 1,735 1,735 1,735.0 1 596 1 0.00%
p0.6pS0.6n40s3311.0 311 938 938 938.0 1 500 1 0.00%
p0.6pS0.6n40s4313.5 313 4,542 3,062 1,514 3 1,565 1 0.15%
p0.8pS0.6n35s0304.0 304 1,714 1,277 342.8 5 829 3 0.00%
p0.8pS0.6n35s1294.5 294 1,746 834 116.4 15 1,614 2 0.16%
p0.8pS0.6n35s2299.0 299 1,670 1,670 1,670.0 1 704 1 0.00%
p0.8pS0.6n35s3307.0 307 1,070 1,070 1,070.0 1 567 1 0.00%
p0.8pS0.6n35s4298.0 298 1,137 1,137 1,137.0 1 422 1 0.00%
p0.8pS0.6n40s0395.0 395 4,271 4,271 4,271.0 1 839 1 0.00%
p0.8pS0.6n40s1380.5 380 6,643 4,522 2,214.0 3 1,500 1 0.13%
p0.8pS0.6n40s2385.0 385 6,402 6,402 6,402.0 1 850 1 0.00%
p0.8pS0.6n40s3394.0 394 9,791 9,791 9,791.0 1 897 1 0.00%
p0.8pS0.6n40s4387.0 387 7,278 7,278 7,278 1 734 1 0.00%
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tion method (finding inequalities defining facets of a subjacent polyhedral
relaxation) that tightens the LP relaxations towards a branch and cut algo-
rithm.
A Appendix: The coordination valuation
Let G = (V,E) be graph and C ⊆ V be a coalition, we define
ni(C) = |{jk ∈ E : j ∈ C, k /∈ C, ij, ik ∈ E}|.
The coordination coalition valuation function ([13]) is
v : 2V → R, v(C) =
∑
i∈C
ni(C),∀C ⊆ V.
This function accounts for all cliques of three agents, two of them being
inside the coalition, while the third is outside. It is designed to offer coali-
tions that include agents that have common neighbours from outside. We
will generalize this definition by including the weight of the 3-clique as the
sum of the weights on its edges. Hence, we consider first w : E → R to be
an weight on the edges of G. Second, if v is the characteristic vector for the
generic coalition C, then
v(C) =
n∑
i=1
vi
n∑
j=1
wijvj
n∑
k=1
wikwjk(1− vk).
We get the coordination valuation function by taking w to be the edge
characteristic function, i. e., wij = 1, if ij ∈ E, and 0 otherwise. The
sub-problem (14) becomes:
max

 n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
wijwikwjkvivj(1− vk) +
∑
i∈V
piivi

 (29)
∑
i∈Cj
vi +
∑
i/∈Cj
(1− vi) ≥ 1,∀j ∈ J (30)
vi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ V (31)
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A.1 Reducing the degree of the objective function
Using the same method of Glover from ([6]), we will transfom the cubic ob-
jective function from (29) to a quadratic one by adding only n new unknowns
and 4n new (quadratic) constraints. We introduce first the variables
zi = vi
n∑
j=1
vj
(
n∑
k=1
wijwikwjk(1− vk)
)
,∀i ∈ V.
Second, add the constraints
Y −i vi ≤ zi ≤ Y
+
i vi,∀i ∈ V
n∑
j=1
vj
(
n∑
k=1
wijwikwjk(1− vk)
)
− Y +i (1− vi) ≤ zi,∀i ∈ V
n∑
j=1
vj
(
n∑
k=1
wijwikwjk(1− vk)
)
− Y −i (1− vi) ≥ zi,∀i ∈ V,
(32)
where Y −i and Y
+
i are a lower and, respectively, an upper bound for the
expression
n∑
j=1
vj
(
n∑
k=1
wijwikwjk(1− vk)
)
.
Y −i and Y
+
i could be
Y −i =

 ∑
j,k:wijwikwjk<0
wijwikwjk

 /2
Y +i =

 ∑
j,k:wijwikwjk>0
wijwikwjk

 /2
(33)
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The problem (29) - (31) becomes
max
(
n∑
i=1
piivi +
n∑
i=1
zi
)
(34)
∑
i∈Cj
vi +
∑
i/∈Cj
(1− vi) ≥ 1,∀j ∈ J, (35)
n∑
j=1
vj
(
n∑
k=1
wijwikwjk(1− vk)
)
+ Y +i vi − zi ≤ Y
+
i ,∀i ∈ V, (36)
n∑
j=1
vj
(
n∑
k=1
wijwikwjk(1− vk)
)
+ Y −i vi − zi ≥ Y
−
i ,∀i ∈ V, (37)
Y −i vi − zi ≤ 0,∀i ∈ V, (38)
Y +i vi − zi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ V, (39)
vi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ V, (40)
zi ∈ R,∀i ∈ V. (41)
(For the coordination valuation function we can simply take Y −i = 0
and Y +i = n
2, for all i ∈ V .)
This last problem is a Mixed Integer Quadratically Constrained Pro-
gramming (MIQCP) problem that could also be solved using a mathemati-
cal optimization solver. Another way of addressing this problem is to apply
again the method of Glover to the expressions
zij = vj
(
n∑
k=1
wijwikwjk(1− vk)
)
,
which will add n2 new variables and 4n2 new constraints to the problem.
A.2 Branch and Bound version for the coordination valua-
tion function
Suppose as above that the current node in the branching tree has a subset of
already covered agents, U =
⋃
j∈J :xj=1
Cj, and U
′ = V \U . For this valuation
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function the sub-problem (14) becomes:
max

∑
i∈U ′
∑
j∈U ′
(∑
k∈U ′
wijwikwjkvivj(1− vk) +
∑
k∈U
wijwikwjkvivj
)
+
+
∑
i∈U ′
piivi
]
(42)∑
i∈Cj
vi +
∑
i/∈Cj
(1− vi) ≥ 1,∀j ∈ J, (43)
vi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ U
′. (44)
Using the above degree reduction procedure for the objective function
we introduce the variables
zi = vi
∑
j∈U ′
vj
(∑
k∈U ′
wijwikwjk(1− vk) +
∑
k∈U
wijwikwjk
)
,∀i ∈ U ′.
Second, add the constraints
Y −i vi ≤ zi ≤ Y
+
i vi,∀i ∈ V∑
j∈U ′
vj
(∑
k∈U ′
wijwikwjk(1− vk) +
∑
k∈U
wijwikwjk
)
− Y +i (1− vi) ≤ zi,∀i ∈ U
′
∑
j∈U ′
vj
(∑
k∈U ′
wijwikwjk(1− vk) +
∑
k∈U
wijwikwjk
)
− Y −i (1− vi) ≥ zi,∀i ∈ U
′,
where Y −i and Y
+
i are a lower and, respectively, an upper bound for the
expression
∑
j∈U ′
vj
(∑
k∈U ′
wijwikwjk(1− vk) +
∑
k∈U
wijwikwjk
)
.
Y −i and Y
+
i could be
Y −i =

 ∑
j,k∈U ′:wijwikwjk<0
wijwikwjk

 /2 + ∑
j∈U ′,k∈U :wijwikwjk<0
wijwikwjk
Y +i =

 ∑
j,k∈U ′:wijwikwjk>0
wijwikwjk

 /2 + ∑
j∈U ′,k∈U :wijwikwjk>0
wijwikwjk
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The problem (29) - (31) becomes
max
(∑
i∈U ′
zi +
∑
i∈W ′
piivi
)
(45)
∑
i∈Cj
vi +
∑
i/∈Cj
(1− vi) ≥ 1,∀j ∈ J, (46)
∑
j∈U ′
vj
(∑
k∈U ′
wijwikwjk(1− vk) +
∑
k∈U
wijwikwjk
)
+ Y +i vi − zi ≤ Y
+
i ,∀i ∈ U
′,
(47)
∑
j∈U ′
vj
(∑
k∈U ′
wijwikwjk(1− vk) +
∑
k∈U
wijwikwjk
)
+ Y −i vi − zi ≥ Y
−
i ,∀i ∈ U
′,
(48)
Y −i vi − zi ≤ 0,∀i ∈ U
′, (49)
Y +i vi − zi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ U
′, (50)
vi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ U
′, (51)
zi ∈ R,∀i ∈ U
′. (52)
(For the coordination valuation function we can simply take Y −i = 0
and Y +i = |U
′|2/2 + |U ′| · |U | ≤ 3n2/4, for all i ∈ U ′.)
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